

## **Chapter 3**

### **COMBAT OPERATIONS IN JULY 1950**

The combat operations conducted in July 1950 marked a very fluid, and often confusing, period of the Korean War. The previous chapter described how the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) moved rapidly against South Korea nearly unchecked. Intelligence on the enemy proved an early challenge to the U.S. Army units rushed overseas to stem the North Korean tide. In fact, intelligence gathering on the Korean peninsula received scant attention prior to the NKPA's assault because the U.S. spent the immediate post-World War II years focusing on a potential war with their new Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union. But several intelligence successes, and hasty delaying actions by the 24th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions, caused the North Korean Army to pay dearly for the ground they gained.

This period in July 1950 requires some particular focus with regard to the alleged incident near No Gun Ri. To explain effectively the events of this particular period of July 25 to July 29, one must understand the intelligence available to the U.S. and Allied forces during that time; the flow of battlefield events, to include the 1st Cavalry Division's relief of the 24th Infantry Division, the battle for Yongdong, the U.S. withdrawal to the Nakdong River; and the Air Force, Navy, and UN air operations that supported these battlefield activities. A discussion of these topics and how they fit together paints a clearer picture of the events and the intelligence and aviation factors that affected those events. But the first, most crucial challenge the U.S. Army faced at that time was determining how the North Koreans fought, where they were disposed on the battlefield, and what they planned to do next.

#### **I. U.S. Army Intelligence in July 1950**

United States Army doctrine in 1950 defined military intelligence as "evaluated and interpreted information concerning a possible or actual enemy, or theater of operations, including terrain and weather, together with the conclusions drawn there from." That same doctrine defined combat intelligence as "military intelligence produced in the field, after the outbreak of hostilities, by the military intelligence sections of all tactical headquarters."<sup>1</sup> The primary purpose of combat intelligence was "to reduce as far as possible uncertainties regarding the enemy, terrain, and weather and thus assist the commander in making a decision and the troops in executing their assigned missions".<sup>2</sup> The intelligence officer, using "all available information," was expected to: "(1) Determine the enemy capabilities or the lines of action open to the enemy that would have a bearing on the accomplishment of the commander's mission. (2) Determine the conditions under which any particular capability may be carried out; for example, the time, place and strength of an attack. (3) Draw conclusions in certain cases as to the relative probability of adoption of lines of action open to the enemy."<sup>3</sup> Commanders, however, were warned that they "must be certain

that they base their action, dispositions and plans upon *estimates of the enemy capabilities rather than upon estimates of the enemy's intentions*" (Emphasis in original).<sup>4</sup>

## **II. Institutional Intelligence Weaknesses**

In July 1950, military intelligence in the U.S. Army suffered from a number of weaknesses. The Army did not have a military intelligence branch filled by officers whose primary specialty was intelligence. Instead, officers from various branches were detailed to serve in intelligence positions. Some fields of intelligence, such as counterintelligence and signals intelligence, possessed a core of officers and men with World War II experience in these areas, and the need for such specialties in peacetime kept training programs in these fields open after the end of World War II. Combat intelligence, however, generated no such demand; the Military Intelligence Training Center, which during World War II trained combat intelligence specialists, closed soon after the war ended. During the interwar period, training in this field for those assigned to intelligence positions at echelons from army to battalion consisted of a hodgepodge of intelligence classes at various Army schools, unit training programs, self-study, and on-the-job experience. Combat intelligence effectiveness also suffered from the inadequate training of infantrymen and infantry units in patrolling skills.<sup>5</sup>

Other deficiencies in the military's intelligence capability resulted from Army-wide problems. The austere post-war budgets produced little money for new equipment, so units deployed to Korea in 1950 fought mostly with weapons, vehicles, equipment, and material produced during World War II; many of these items were either worn out or damaged by improper storage. Unable to man fully all units according to authorized personnel strength levels, the Army, by July 1950, had eliminated entire units or some units' subordinate elements. Eighth Army's two corps-level headquarters, a vital link between the division and army echelons, were deactivated in early 1950. Given the powerful artillery force the North Koreans possessed in July 1950, two serious deficiencies in intelligence gathering were that the infantry regiments lacked their counter-fire platoon, used to locate enemy artillery and mortars, and that Eighth Army did not have the artillery acquisition battalions normally assigned to a field army. No mobile tactical communications interception units existed in Japan, and none were available in the United States ready enough to deploy overseas without several months of preparation.<sup>6</sup>

## **III. The American Understanding of the Enemy from July 22 to July 30, 1950**

American military planning after World War II focused on only one contingency -- war with the Soviet Union. Therefore, American intelligence collection efforts between 1945 and 1950 focused on the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, on China after the Communists won the civil war there in 1949. In

the Far East Command, intelligence efforts focused on monitoring these two nations and supporting the American occupation of Japan. Given these priorities, the American military boasted few Korean linguists in 1950, and much of the military's information on North Korea came from intelligence collected by South Korean civilian and military intelligence agencies. Additionally, North Korea's intensive counter-intelligence efforts often frustrated what little attention American intelligence gave to North Korea before June 25, 1950.<sup>7</sup>

Between the start of the war and the 1st Cavalry Division's move from Japan to Korea, the division's intelligence staff "gathered and disseminated available information on Korea, made plans, held briefings, secured necessary equipment, added [sic] personnel and arranged for distribution of maps throughout the command." On July 10, the division published an intelligence standing operating procedure to provide guidance on conducting intelligence operations. The procedure only briefly mentioned civilians, directing that "all natives in operational areas will, in the event of any doubt, be considered as hostile until definitely proven friendly." The procedure did not mention how units should handle civilians attempting to move through American positions. On July 22, the intelligence staff provided guidance on this issue, directing that civilians "infiltrating through our lines will be arrested and turned over to CIC [the Counter-Intelligence Corps]."<sup>8</sup>

During the voyage from Japan to Korea, the division intelligence staff, reinforced with a team from the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment, continued preparing for combat, although the staff received "very meager" information on the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) from the Eighth Army staff.<sup>9</sup> In the 7th Cavalry Regiment, the regimental operations officer or the regimental intelligence officer briefed each company "on the situation and [gave] pointers on combat, what to expect, how to react, and the like."<sup>10</sup>

In July 1950, the intelligence staffs at Eighth Army and the 1st Cavalry Division employed a variety of source materials in their efforts to view the battlefield and understand the NKPA. Much of the material used by intelligence staffs came from subordinate units: information on engagements with NKPA units; reports of shelling by NKPA artillery and mortars; reports from ground patrols; and reports from aerial observers using L-5 and L-17 liaison aircraft. Battalion and regimental intelligence sections at times provided their analysis of the situation along with the material they forwarded to higher echelons. Other sources used by army and division intelligence staffs included post-mission pilot debriefings provided by Fifth Air Force; aerial photo reconnaissance; American advisors serving with Republic of Korea (ROK) units; Korean National Police units; South Korean officials; South Korean civilians, usually refugees crossing American lines; interrogations of captured NKPA personnel; and examinations of captured NKPA weapons and material. In August and September 1950, during the battles on the Pusan perimeter, interception and analysis of NKPA radio

traffic played an important role, but this capability was not available during the withdrawal to the perimeter in July 1950.<sup>11</sup>

#### **IV. The Periodic Intelligence Report**

Intelligence from higher echelons, both regularly scheduled reports and spot reports, could do much to shape an organization's understanding of the enemy and the wider battlefield. While higher echelons sent subordinate units spot intelligence reports as required by the tactical situation, most of the intelligence flow from Eighth Army to the divisions, and from divisions to their regiments, came in the form of a "Periodic Intelligence Report" (PIR). Eighth Army's daily PIR covered the period from midnight to midnight. The PIR outlined the enemy situation at the end of the period (often by using an enclosed overlay or map); briefly discussed enemy operations during the period and then reviewed operations in more detail by component elements (infantry, artillery, armor, and so on); reported any new enemy tactics, weapons, and material encountered; provided estimates of enemy losses, combat efficiency, morale, and supply status; and forecasted the next day's weather. The last paragraph of the PIR discussed the enemy's possible courses of actions and the intelligence staff's estimate of the enemy's probable courses of action. Occasionally, the PIR included an annex that provided detailed information on subjects such as the enemy order of battle or enemy tactics and equipment. The PIRs prepared by division intelligence staffs and sent to regiments followed the same format; however, divisions used a 24-hour reporting cycle of 6:00 PM to 6:00 PM.<sup>12</sup>

#### **V. The Accuracy of the Eighth Army's Intelligence**

Overall, despite the weaknesses in the Army's intelligence capability, Eighth Army and the 1st Cavalry Division during this period had sufficiently accurate combat intelligence. Neither Eighth Army nor the 1st Cavalry Division suffered serious reverses because the NKPA caught them by surprise.

As the 24th Infantry Division delayed the NKPA between July 5 and July 19, Eighth Army collected enough enemy information to provide the 1st Cavalry Division with an accurate outline of the tactics they could expect the NKPA to use. During the remainder of the month, Eighth Army provided its divisions with more detailed information on the NKPA, culminating with the publication of "Combat Information Bulletin Number One."

Eighth Army tended to overestimate the strength the NKPA would commit to the Taejon-Kumchon axis. The Eighth Army missed, until late July, the 4th Division's turn to the south after the capture of Taejon to join the 6th Division in the effort to envelop Eighth Army's left flank. By July 26, the Eighth Army had identified the three NKPA divisions that opposed the 1st Cavalry and the 25th Infantry Divisions, although the Eighth Army probably overestimated the combat effectiveness of these units (During July, Eighth Army significantly

underestimated the number of casualties its units, the Fifth Air Force, and the ROK Army inflicted on the NKPA.). This tendency further manifested itself in the fact that most American units, when making initial enemy contact, magnified the size and strength of the enemy forces because they lacked the combat experience required to make accurate judgments.<sup>13</sup>

Probably the most important achievement of Eighth Army's intelligence staff during this period was its warning on July 23 that one course of action open to the NKPA included a deep envelopment of the Eighth Army's left flank in southwestern Korea, an area covered at this time by only a few hundred South Korean troops and local police. This warning led to increased aerial reconnaissance of southwestern Korea that detected the NKPA's deep envelopment, although Eighth Army's intelligence staff erroneously identified the unit conducting the maneuver as the 4th Division (in truth the 6th Division). Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, the Eighth Army's commander, could then move the 24th Infantry Division, recently relieved by the 1st Cavalry Division at Yongdong, into position to delay the NKPA's advance and to prevent the North Koreans from enveloping Eighth Army's flank.<sup>14</sup> The focus then shifted to the 1st Cavalry Division, the U.S. unit that would undergo a baptism of fire during that last critical week of July 1950.

## **VI. 1st Cavalry Division in 1950**

The 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry) was organized, like the other divisions stationed in Japan in 1950, according to a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) published in 1948.<sup>15</sup> As discussed in Chapter 2, the authorized peacetime manning levels for this period meant that the three infantry regiments comprised only two of the three battalions normally assigned. Likewise, each regiment lacked its authorized tank company. These missing units did not represent the only personnel and organizational shortfall in this peacetime structure; the division artillery battalions were reduced to two firing batteries. In addition, the division's equipment was largely of World War II vintage. These limitations had little impact on a force tasked only with occupation duty. The early days of the Korean War, however, clearly laid bare the inadequacies of this structure for combat.

Historians generally accept the fact that the soldiers of the Army of Occupation functioned merely as a constabulary, ill-trained and ill-equipped to fight a modern war against a well-trained and well-equipped adversary. While critical limitations in the training and equipment of the 1st Cavalry Division existed, the officers and men were not incompetent or unprofessional in any way. After reviewing a portion of the pre-publication manuscript of the first volume of the Army's official history of the Korean War, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* by Roy Appleman, General Douglas MacArthur took strong exception to the frequent references to the poor state of the troops under his command in Japan. In a letter to the Chief of Military History concerning the manuscript, he

underscored the fact that soldiers in Japan met the same standards the Army demanded of soldiers stationed anywhere else in the world. If the standards proved inadequate, that fault rested with the Army. MacArthur wrote:

The criticism, by implication, seems to apply solely to occupation troops. This is incorrect. The same weaknesses existed in all American troops. The divisions that came later to Korea from the United States were no better or worse than those from Japan. The policies, which caused these deficiencies, were formulated in Washington, not in the Occupation.<sup>16</sup>

The 1st Cavalry Division's critical personnel shortages proved just as serious as the shortages in organization. To bring the 24th Infantry Division up to strength prior to that division's departure from Japan for Korea, the 1st Cavalry Division transferred to the 24th Division nearly 800 men, most of them senior non-commissioned officers.<sup>17</sup> The Army made every effort to correct these shortfalls through promotion and reorganization, but no organization can effectively perform its mission with so many non-commissioned officers missing.

## **VII. Training and Equipment in the 1st Cavalry Division**

To assume that no training, or inappropriate training, occurred in Japan is also misleading. The 1st Cavalry Division was relieved of its occupation duties in 1950 specifically to conduct comprehensive unit training. The division initiated a training cycle designed to progress from the individual soldier to the regimental level. The deployment alert left the 1st Cavalry Division unable to finish its training plan. In the case of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, this program had focused on squad-, platoon-, and company-level training and had not progressed to the battalion and regimental level.<sup>18</sup>

The material condition of the 1st Cavalry Division also affected its fighting ability. Several shortages existed in all units in Korea; the 1st Cavalry was no exception. General Walker, the Eighth Army Commander, issued these instructions to the Commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, General Gay:

You will take over from what is left of the 24th Division northwest of Yongdong, protect Yongdong, but remember that there are no friendly troops behind you. You must keep your back door open. You can live without food, but you cannot exist long without ammunition and unless the Yongdong -- Taegu Road is kept open, you will soon be without ammunition.<sup>19</sup>

The 1st Cavalry Division quickly recognized the reality of these instructions. The division also experienced shortages in ammunition and other supplies. These shortages influenced the pace of the withdrawal. The threat of infiltration and flanking attacks remained until the division reached the Naktong River, but the need to secure the supply route from Taegu was equally important in the decision to move rapidly from Hwanggan to Kumchon.

The effectiveness of antitank weapons is another common explanation of why U.S. Army performance failed to meet expectations. The standard issue antitank weapon for infantry units was the 2.36-inch rocket launcher, commonly referred to as the bazooka. This weapon proved to be totally ineffective against NKPA T-34 tanks, causing considerable fear among U.S. soldiers. Under development when the war broke out, but not yet in the hands of the troops, was the much-improved 3.5-inch rocket launcher. Supplies of these weapons were airlifted into Korea and issued to the 24th Infantry Division by July 11, 1950, which was too late to assist Task Force Smith. But the new rocket launchers proved a welcome addition to the infantryman's arsenal.<sup>20</sup> After relieving the 24th Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division received some of the 24th Division's 3.5s with ammunition.<sup>21</sup> Although in short supply in the first weeks of the war, the 1st Cavalry Division's organic antitank weapons proved capable of successfully engaging and destroying the NKPA T-34 tanks.

Nearly as important as ammunition, water became a critical problem. Leaders frequently reminded soldiers to use water only from authorized water points. A chronic shortage of trucks with water trailers and of water purification tablets issued with C rations forced thirsty soldiers to drink from streams and rice paddies. Dysentery became commonplace and affected the strength and well being of the individual soldier, often leading to evacuation from the combat area.<sup>22</sup>

All of these manning and supply problems do not explain adequately what may appear as poor performance on the battlefield. Pure hubris led to the belief that the Army could not lose a battle to the NKPA, but portraying these men as incapable is equally inaccurate. This understanding is critical when evaluating the discipline and the performance of the 1st Cavalry Division. Mistakes occurred, particularly as elements of the division engaged in combat for the first time (for example the disorganized withdrawal of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment on the night of July 25-26, 1950); however, no systemic breakdown in discipline or performance occurred. Prudent tactics called for the necessary trading of space for time until the Allies could establish the Naktong defenses and until the first counterattack, the Inchon landings, could create favorable conditions for the breakout and pursuit of the NKPA.

## VIII. The 1st Cavalry Division Lands in Korea

The 1st Cavalry Division was alerted for possible deployment to Korea on July 1, 1950. The outbreak of the war and the departure of the 24th Infantry Division clearly signaled that the division had to be prepared. The division staff requested missing personnel and equipment immediately. Unfortunately, little in the way of replacements or equipment was on hand.<sup>23</sup>

The division traveled by sea to Korea in two lifts. The 5th and 8th Cavalry comprised the first lift, and the 7th Cavalry arrived in the second lift. The 5th and 8th Cavalry arrived in Korea on July 18 and moved forward to the Yongdong area the following day. The battle for Taejon already raged, and the North Koreans began surrounding the 24th Division. The 24th desperately needed replacements and a chance to reorganize. The 34th Infantry Regiment, caught in Taejon by the 3rd NKPA Division, was incapable of offensive action. The 1st Cavalry Division now faced this same enemy division in Yongdong.

The 1st Cavalry Division's intelligence staff landed at Pohang on July 18 and moved to Kumchon, where the division command post was established. As elements of the 24th Infantry Division awaited the NKPA's attack against Taejon, Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 19 reported that increased pressure in the Taejon area and "the probable shift of elements of 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Divisions to the West and South West" indicated that the enemy's main effort would indeed be along the Choch'iwon-Taejon axis. The PIR also passed along information obtained from interrogating captured NKPA soldiers. Enemy tactics included "a frontal attack with flanking movement supported by artillery. The unit attacking frontally is widely dispersed and keeps up heavy fire, while strong flanking elements constitute the main effort." Enemy soldiers said they had been told that Japanese troops were fighting on behalf of the South Korean government and that "Americans will retreat in combat."<sup>24</sup>

On July 20, the 1st Cavalry Division received a copy of Eighth Army's "Combat Lesson Number One." The lesson outlined the infiltration tactics used by the NKPA, noting that individuals or small groups "work themselves behind our lines under cover and then assemble at a predesignated point." From that point, the now reassembled NKPA unit would "attack against the rear or flanks of our troops." The lesson warned that the location of the assembly points in the American rear areas used by infiltrators "must be determined promptly by aggressive patrolling and intelligence operations." Then "reserve echelons supporting front line units, particularly artillery or armored vehicles, must be promptly dispatched to [the] area in order to liquidate the assembled forces."<sup>25</sup> As noted earlier, the 1st Cavalry Division lacked sufficient personnel and their full complement of units to form the reserve echelons capable of dealing with infiltrators assembling in their rear areas.



## IX. Facing the Enemy

The last elements of the 24th Infantry Division passed rearward through Yongdong on July 22 to become, temporarily, the Eighth Army reserve. By the end of July 21, the 1st Cavalry Division, along with the 25th Infantry Division and elements of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, faced elements of several NKPA divisions determined to win at all costs. Immediately after the 1st Cavalry Division disembarked in Korea, the Eighth Army directed the division to move forward to the Yongdong-Kumchon area. The 1st Cavalry Division quickly deployed both the 5th and 8th Cavalry to defend Yongdong.<sup>26</sup> Yongdong is about 10 miles across rugged, hilly countryside from No Gun Ri (See maps 3 -11 Appendix E for day-to-day positions).

As the 1st Cavalry Division relieved the 24th Infantry Division around Yongdong, Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 21 described the enemy's combat efficiency as unchanged and morale among enemy troops as "excellent." The PIR reported that the enemy's "continued attack in the TAEJON area by elements of two or three divisions" and "increased enemy pressure along the left front of the ROK I Corp [sic]" indicated that the NKPA's main effort was along the Taejon-Kumchon axis -- in the 1st Cavalry Division's new sector.<sup>27</sup> The 1st Cavalry Division's Operation Order 9-50, dated 7:00 AM July 22, identified the NKPA 2nd and 3rd Divisions as opposing the division, each with an estimated strength of 8,775 soldiers. Elements of the NKPA 4th Division were reported to be in reserve behind the other two divisions. The 1st Cavalry Division's intelligence staff warned that the most likely course of action for these enemy units was to "continue to advance on our positions in the vicinity southeast of TAEJON with primary effort being to envelop our flanks and thus cut off our units one at a time. Envelopment will be attempted on both flanks with major effort coming from the southeast." The order directed that civilians "infiltrating through our lines will be arrested and turned over to CIC [Counter-Intelligence Corps]."<sup>28</sup>

The 5th Cavalry Regiment became the first unit committed to combat. The 5th's mission was to relieve the 21st Infantry and the other remaining elements of the 24th Infantry Division in the vicinity of Yongdong.<sup>29</sup> This plan changed when the regiment could not advance from its assembly areas due to the congested roads. A combination of retreating U.S. and ROK troops, along with the ever-present refugees, made forward progress so slow that the 5th could not relieve the 21st Infantry in time. The 8th Cavalry moved forward to relieve the 21st and to prevent the occupation of Yongdong from the northwest and southwest.<sup>30</sup>

The Eighth Army knew that the loss of Taejon and the withdrawal from the Kum River meant that the next defensive barrier was the Naktong River. With friendly forces still outnumbered by the NKPA, a series of planned withdrawals would prevent a repeat of the disastrous losses incurred in the defense of

Taejon. Since the 1st Cavalry Division could not defend Yongdong indefinitely, the division conducted a delaying action on the way back to the Nakdong.

## **X. July 22, 1950**

The 8th Cavalry Regiment became the first element to make contact with forward elements of the 24th Infantry Division, relieving the 21st Infantry Regiment northwest of Yongdong at 12:30 PM on July 22, 1950. The 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, moved into position on the Taejon-Yongdong Road north of town near Ojong ni while the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, covered the southern flank astride the Kumsan-Muju Road. There was no contact between the battalions and there was no friendly troops stationed in the town itself.<sup>31</sup>

With the 8th Cavalry initially deployed north and west of Yongdong, the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, dug in east of the town in the vicinity of the village of Kwan ni to prevent a possible envelopment. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, remained in Hwanggan for the moment. The 8th Cavalry did not have long to wait for contact with the enemy.

The 1st Cavalry Division's first PIR was dated 6:00 PM July 22 and reported only one minor contact by an 8th Cavalry Regiment patrol with a NKPA patrol in the previous 24 hours. Division aerial observers, however, reported large numbers of refugees moving east towards Yongdong. The PIR warned that based on recent engagements, "it is expected [that the] enemy has large remaining forces." Five possible enemy courses of action against the division were listed: 1) Attack the 5th Cavalry Regiment with elements of 2-3 divisions; 2) Envelop one or both flanks of the 8th Cavalry Regiment; 3) Attack the left flank of the division; 4) Defend current positions with current forces; 5) Reinforce current units and execute any of the preceding four options. The PIR advised that the most likely enemy course of action adopted the first two options, attacking both the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments concurrently. The next most likely course of action involved an attack on the division's left flank.<sup>32</sup>

Eighth Army's next PIR for midnight on July 22 reported a change in the enemy's intentions, stating that the NKPA was most likely shifting its main effort to the central sector along the Chongju-Hamchang and Yongju-Andong axes in the ROK I Corps's zone to the north of the 1st Cavalry Division's zone. This new evaluation of the enemy's intent resulted from reports described the Taejon area as "relatively quiet," the NKPA's failure to maintain heavy pressure along the Taejon-Kumchon axis after the 24th Infantry Division's withdrawal from Taejon, and a terrain analysis of the enemy's likely avenues of approach. Recent bad weather supported this conclusion, Eighth Army believed, and limited American aerial reconnaissance and "reduced opportunities for identifications in retrograde operations." These conditions provided the NKPA "with an excellent opportunity for lateral movement and reconcentration of elements of the 2 to 3 divisions previously committed in the TAEJON area."<sup>33</sup>

## **XI. July 23, 1950**

On the morning of July 23, the 1st Cavalry Division moved its forward command post from Kumchon to Hwanggan to more effectively direct operations in the Yongdong area. The Eighth Army authorized the division to commit the 5th Cavalry at its discretion, and the remainder of the regiment moved forward from Hwanggan to defensive positions east of Yongdong with the Regimental Command Post established in Kwan ni.<sup>34</sup>

The 8th Cavalry's baptism of fire began in the 1st Battalion's sector northwest of Yongdong. Heavy artillery and mortar fire fell throughout the day, and reports of enemy tanks surfaced for the first time. Southwest of town, the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, area remained quiet. Artillery fire from the 11th, 77th, and 99th Field Artillery Battalions accounted for five enemy tanks and 15 other vehicles. The threat of envelopment became a real concern to the 8th Cavalry as an aerial observer saw groups of what appeared to be NKPA soldiers dressed in white southwest of Yongdong.<sup>35</sup>

Civilian refugees remained a constant problem. Artillery units were particularly concerned that refugees sympathetic to North Korea or North Korean agents could transmit battery locations to the NKPA for use in targeting. The artillery proved particularly vulnerable to sniping and attack from infiltrators since the soldiers had to man their guns continually. To prevent these attacks from happening, a patrol from the division artillery cleared civilians from a town southwest of Yongdong on July 23. This action, a necessary precaution, ran contrary to the 1st Cavalry Division and Eighth Army's policy of encouraging villagers in the countryside to stay in their homes. This incident represents the only recorded instance of such an event in the last week of July 1950.<sup>36</sup>

To assist in the screening of these refugees, the 1st Cavalry Division received a Republic of Korea Army Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment assigned to work with its U.S. counterpart.<sup>37</sup> The 545th Military Police Company also handled refugees in the Yongdong area with assistance from the Korean National Police. These military policemen and their Korean augmentees shouldered the Herculean task of keeping the roads open for vital military movements while trying to prevent disguised enemy soldiers or sympathizers from crossing the lines. While performing this mission on July 23, a military policeman and his Korean National Police partner were killed when their jeep inadvertently drove over a friendly mine on the outskirts of Yongdong.<sup>38</sup>

The division's 6:00 PM July 23 PIR interpreted attacks on the 8th Cavalry Regiment during the morning and afternoon as NKPA reconnaissance efforts and warned that: "[I]ndications of movement around our flanks bear out his [the NKPA's] continued use of the double or single envelopment." The PIR reported that screening of refugees moving through the division's zone, conducted by American military police and intelligence personnel with South Korean soldiers

and intelligence personnel, resulted in the detention of several individuals suspected as enemy agents. Furthermore, two persons claiming to be Red Cross personnel were apprehended with a map showing the locations of all the division's artillery battalions. The PIR concluded that the NKPA's possible and probable courses of action would not change.<sup>39</sup>

Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 23 noted that a refugee had reported 10,000 troops with 10 light artillery pieces located west of Taejon. The PIR again concluded that the NKPA's most likely course of action focused its main effort toward Hamchang and / or Andong, north of the 1st Cavalry Division's sector, but the PIR now modified this conclusion by stating that the NKPA would at the same time attempt a deep envelopment south of Eighth Army's left flank through Chongju and Namwon. The second most likely course of action focused the main effort against the 1st Cavalry Division along the Taejon-Kumchon axis together with the deep envelopment. The NKPA's combat effectiveness and morale rated as good.<sup>40</sup>

## **XII. July 24, 1950**

The battle on July 24 continued with artillery and mortar fire and increased enemy infiltration. The enemy initiated a series of ambushes behind the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, on the battalion's main supply route. Attacks made by the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, supported by tanks from Company A, 71st Tank Battalion, to clear this obstacle proved unsuccessful. The battalion commander was wounded and subsequently evacuated. The 8th Cavalry realized that they needed better defensive positions or the NKPA would trap the regiment in Yongdong just like the 34th Infantry at Taejon. The 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, with Company F, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry attached, and the 77th Field Artillery Battalion in support, shifted from its positions east of Yongdong to the high ground southwest of town to meet this threat while the remainder of 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry remained in position east of Yongdong. The purpose of this maneuver was to defend the area west of Yongdong, thus preventing the 3rd NKPA Division from outflanking the 1st Cavalry Division or penetrating the undefended American rear area. By the evening of July 24, both threats became serious enough to require a withdrawal from Yongdong.<sup>41</sup>

Realizing the serious danger to the 8th Cavalry, the 1st Cavalry Division issued Operations Plan 10-50, calling for a disengagement and withdrawal of the 8th Cavalry to keep the NKPA from outflanking the regiment and decisively engaging the cavalymen in Yongdong.<sup>42</sup> The Eighth Army's strategy did not include fighting for every town and village. The Eighth Army lacked the necessary strength for that purpose. Instead, the Eighth Army opted to withdraw behind the last major defensible terrain feature, the Naktong River. The division's withdrawal became part of this army-level strategy. The plan called for the 5th Cavalry to support the 8th Cavalry's disengagement from the NKPA and

rearward movement out of Yongdong toward Hwanggan, where the 8th Cavalry would assume the role of the division's reserve.

The 7th Cavalry, meanwhile, had arrived in Korea on July 22, 1950, as part of the division's second lift from Japan. The east coast of Korea was suffering a determined NKPA attack, and the 1st Battalion remained in the Pohangdong area to defend the port and adjacent airfield. The remainder of the 7th Cavalry moved forward to the Yongdong area, arriving in its designated assembly area near the village Sot Anmak in the late afternoon. The 7th Cavalry's mission charged them with preventing enemy infiltration while also supporting the 5th Cavalry in the event the 8th Cavalry could not break contact and move east from Yongdong.<sup>43</sup>

With the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, employed on the east coast, the already under-strength 7th Cavalry lacked a reserve force. Ordered to reorganize the regiment to create a reserve (called a "provisional force" in the quotation below), Colonel Nist, the regimental commander, made his estimate of the situation very clear in a conversation with the division operations officer on July 24:

I have no wish to "fight the problem"[;] however I feel that I must point out the following simple facts:  
a. That if this force is employed there will be no Headquarters Company, 7th Cavalry (Inf) since I have taken every available man including communications personnel in order to give the maximum firepower to my provisional force. b. That I have irreparably crippled the 2nd Battalion because I have stripped their motor section of drivers, heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles and ammunition in forming the provisional force.<sup>44</sup>

Despite the regimental commander's reservations, he had no alternative. Fortunately, this provisional force was never committed and the 7th Cavalry, less its 1st Battalion, went forward as originally organized. The 7th Cavalry joined the NKPA in combat, reporting its first enemy contact at 8:00 PM on July 24 when the North Koreans fired on an outpost.<sup>45</sup>

The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 24 PIR echoed Eighth Army's evaluation of NKPA effectiveness and morale and highlighted continual efforts by the enemy to infiltrate the division's zone and establish road blocks. The division estimated that it had inflicted 1,000 casualties on the enemy. The PIR rated the enemy's most probable course of action as: "[C]ontinue pressure on front while developing our left flank and 27th Regiment's right flank."<sup>46</sup>

Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 24 reported increased pressure from the NKPA 2nd and 3rd Divisions against the 1st Cavalry Division and the 27th Regimental Combat Team (RCT). Based on this activity, Eighth Army revised its estimate of the enemy's most probable course of action, now stating that the main effort would move along the Taejon-Kumchon axis together with a deep envelopment through Chongju and Namwon.<sup>47</sup>

### **XIII. July 25, 1950**

July 25 became an eventful day that marked the 1st Cavalry Division's withdrawal from Yongdong and the first significant commitment of the 7th Cavalry to combat. The 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, broke through the ambush where its battalion commander had been wounded the day before, leaving behind Company F, a platoon of tanks from Company A, 71st Tank Battalion, and an element of the 16th Recon Company to act as a rear guard. The rapid advance of the NKPA cut off this rear guard, and this ad hoc force had to make its way out on its own.<sup>48</sup> The 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, broke contact and escaped from Yongdong thanks to the division artillery's superior firepower. The 5th Cavalry withdrew from Yongdong and occupied defensive positions east of town. The day's operations proceeded as planned, but the night would change that fact dramatically.

The events on the night of July 25-26, 1950, remain unclear. Confusion reigned in the forward area as units moved up and back at the same time. The 5th Cavalry relieved the 8th Cavalry. The 8th Cavalry then moved to and occupied an assembly area in the division rear near Hwanggan. Hwanggan is approximately three to four miles east of No Gun Ri. The 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, moved to the rear during the day and reported, before reaching its planned position, that the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, had relieved them. The 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, reported the battalion position by radio and later sent the division an overlay showing the unit's location. A slight discrepancy exists between the two reported locations.<sup>49</sup> The 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, was most probably near the road approximately 1,200 yards north-northeast of the village of Kari as shown on a position overlay sent to the 1st Cavalry Division on July 25. The location of the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, is important because this site helps to establish the exact position of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, on the night of July 25 and the early morning hours of the July 26.

The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 25 PIR estimated that a NKPA regiment had attacked two battalions of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, indicating that at least one enemy division opposed the 1st Cavalry Division. Enemy combat efficiency remained good, but the PIR did not estimate the enemy's most probable intentions.<sup>50</sup>

The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, moved forward with elements of the Regimental Headquarters to support the withdrawal of the 8th Cavalry from

Yongdong on the evening of July 25. The regiment reported its command post location to the division at 8:25 PM, giving the grid coordinates of a position directly across the road from the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry. The 7th Cavalry Regiment's commander later reported that the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, had contact with 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, and that they had no contact with the enemy.<sup>51</sup> What happened during the next several hours remains unclear, particularly with regard to the actions of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry.

Several factors require careful consideration when evaluating the 7th Cavalry's performance on July 25. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, had not yet joined the regiment, which gave the 7th Cavalry a distinct disadvantage in strength. Likewise, the 7th Cavalry did not have an assigned artillery battalion in direct support. July 25 was only the regiment's second day in the forward area and its first week in Korea. Soldiers were aware of the enemy's infiltration tactics. In the words of the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, refugees clogged the roads, and he heard a vehicle pass his location, possibly a tank.<sup>52</sup> Military traffic and refugees crowded the road from Yongdong to Hwanggan, but no other reports of a tank in the rear area exist. The battalion commander most likely heard a vehicle from a withdrawing element belonging to the 8th Cavalry and not a North Korean tank. The fact that he thought it was a tank is indicative of the high level of fear and apprehension present among the soldiers.

Pressure increased on the 25th Infantry Division's 27th Infantry Regiment on the right flank of the 1st Cavalry Division to the north of the 7th Cavalry's positions. A further withdrawal became necessary to avoid a North Korean flanking movement. Regimental operations officers arrived at the division forward command post to receive orders for the next stage of the withdrawal. Sometime during, or shortly after, this conference late on the night of July 25, the 7th Cavalry received a report that a breakthrough had occurred in the 25th Infantry Division sector to the regiment's north.<sup>53</sup> Without specific orders and not in contact with the enemy, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, withdrew in a disorganized and undisciplined manner. The 5th Cavalry reported in its periodic operations report that the 5th thought the 7th Cavalry was moving forward to a "destination unknown" at around midnight.<sup>54</sup> What the 5th Cavalry probably heard was not the 7th Cavalry's movement forward but the beginning of that regiment's disorganized withdrawal.

Sometime during the night, probably after the breakthrough rumor circulated, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, thought that the NKPA had attacked the battalion; resultantly, the battalion withdrew from its established position. Probably believing themselves in danger of envelopment, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, moved out in haste and became disorganized. The Regimental War Diary suggests that the battalion was under extreme NKPA pressure and withdrew to avoid envelopment.<sup>55</sup>

Throughout the 25th of July, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, remained in defensive positions near Pohangdong about 95 miles away on the coast of the Sea of Japan. This battalion became involved in an incident that further illustrates the problems all units in Korea suffered with the numerous refugees on the battlefield. During the hours of darkness on July 25, a group of unidentified individuals approached the battalion perimeter. The soldiers opened fire, and a platoon leader led a patrol to determine the nature of situation first hand. He discovered that they were unarmed civilian refugees and recognized that they posed no threat. His patrol escorted the refugees through the lines, rendered aid to the wounded, and sped them to the rear.<sup>56</sup>

Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 25 estimated that 3,000 enemy troops had attacked the 1st Cavalry Division's left flank during July 25 and that the attacks had cost the NKPA 1,000 casualties. An estimated 1,000 NKPA troops, supported by an unknown number of tanks, attacked the 27th Regimental Combat Team to the right of the 1st Cavalry Division. Six to 10 tanks were sighted east of Yongdong. Eighth Army continued to predict that the enemy's most probable course of action focused the main effort along the Taejon-Kumchon axis, together with the deep envelopment to the south around Eighth Army's left flank.<sup>57</sup>

#### **XIV. July 26, 1950**

With the 1st Cavalry Division clear of Yongdong, the division's units spent July 26 preparing new positions and reorganizing. The 8th Cavalry remained in the division rear near Hwanggan. The 5th Cavalry Regiment initially occupied forward positions near the village of Andae ri. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, finally arrived from Pohangdong and relieved the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, on the high ground overlooking Andae ri on Hill 207 in the late afternoon. Hill 207 represented the high ground east of the double railroad overpass near No Gun Ri.

The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, spent the day reorganizing and recovering stragglers and equipment lost during the previous night's disorganized withdrawal. The battalion's soldiers had abandoned vital radios and crew served weapons during that movement. Nearly 200 men were missing. Major Witherspoon, the Regimental S-3 (Operations Officer), set up a collection point by the roadside, probably in the vicinity of Andae ri, and consolidated the battalion.<sup>58</sup> The battalion spent much of the day going back and forth recovering the abandoned equipment and rounding up the stragglers. According to the 7th Cavalry War Diary, the battalion's leadership did not regain full control of the situation until 9:30 PM.<sup>59</sup> After the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, reorganized, the soldiers dug in on a ridgeline immediately east of and overlooking the hamlet of No Gun Ri and across the road from the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry. They recovered much of the equipment, but 119 men still remained missing.



The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 26 PIR again provided no analysis of the enemy's most probable course of action. The PIR reported, however, that a diary taken from a dead guerrilla indicated that the enemy had an observation post in the division's rear "which commands almost all our positions." The PIR further reported that: "[D]efinite organized guerrilla tactics have been used with indications of coordination and direction from NK forces. Previous to this date only individual and small groups sniping has taken place in our rear areas." The division's pilots reported the first "flak AA [anti-aircraft] fire" since arriving in Korea.<sup>60</sup>

Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 26 estimated that three NKPA divisions opposed the 1st Cavalry and the 25th Infantry Divisions: the 3rd Division in the Yongdong area; the 2nd Division on the 3rd's left flank; and the 15th Division northwest of Sangju. The NKPA's combat efficiency and morale still rated as high, but its logistical support now proved "extremely sporadic and uncertain due to friendly air activity." Eighth Army continued to believe that the enemy's main effort would follow along the Taejon-Kumchon axis together with the deep envelopment to the south around Eighth Army's left flank.<sup>61</sup>

## **XV. July 27, 1950**

The division now occupied positions in the Hwanggan area with the 8th Cavalry in reserve, the 5th Cavalry southwest of the town, and the 7th Cavalry to the west of town near No Gun Ri. The 7th Cavalry was the farthest forward with the 25th Infantry Division's 27th Infantry still on the regiment's right and the 5th Cavalry to the left and rear. The 7th Cavalry was not in direct contact with the enemy but learned from the division that no friendly troops occupied the areas to their south and west in the direction of Yongdong. Throughout the day, patrols reported enemy forces nearby, including tanks spotted in the village of Sot Anmak in front of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and columns of enemy troops advancing from Yongdong on the railroad tracks. In the afternoon, the regiment took fire from tanks in the vicinity of Sot Anmak; timely mortar fire drove off the NKPA armor. However, apart from some artillery and mortar fire, the day proved relatively quiet. The 77th Field Artillery Battalion supported the 7th Cavalry, and the battalion commander visited the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, to ensure that the unit received adequate fire support.<sup>62</sup>

The commander of the 77th Field Artillery Battalion was not the only visitor on July 27. An observer team from the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces arrived to evaluate the state of Army units in Korea and spent the day with the 7th Cavalry. A group of seven journalists, including Tom Lambert of the Associated Press and Dennis Warner of the *Daily Telegraph and London Herald* of Melbourne, also toured the 7th Cavalry's front lines.<sup>63</sup> None of these visitors later reported observing that large numbers of refugees had been, or were being, killed or injured in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.

The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 27 PIR reported extensive NKPA patrolling to identify gaps in the division's new positions east of Yongdong. During the day on July 27, the division's artillery suffered "heavy counter battery fire." The division continued to evaluate the combat efficiency and morale of the opposing NKPA units as good. The PIR warned that the "enemy continues his standard tactic of infiltration, assembl[ing] and attack[ing] our flanks, gaps and rear areas with emphasis on dislodging the supporting artillery." The division intelligence staff evaluated this activity together with reports that enemy troops were moving out of Yongdong, suggesting that the enemy intended a double envelopment of the division.<sup>64</sup>

Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 27 reported that the NKPA, during July 27, had mounted two strong drives: one against South Korean units in the Hamchang-Yongju area and a second, using two divisions supported by strong artillery fire and a small number of tanks, in the Yongdong-Sangju area against the 1st Cavalry Division and the 25th Infantry Division. Eighth Army's intelligence staff still believed that the enemy's main effort would follow along the Taejon-Kumchon axis together with a deep envelopment of Eighth Army's left flank. The PIR also warned that the enemy would "continue and increase guerrilla activity throughout EUSAK [Eighth U.S. Army - Korea] zone and sabotage rail, highway and other communication facilities."<sup>65</sup>

## **XVI. July 28, 1950**

On July 28, the situation on the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry's right flank turned critical. The NKPA launched an all-out attack against the 27th Infantry, forcing that regiment to tighten and contract its front-line positions. This movement opened a gap between the 1st Cavalry and the 25th Infantry Divisions and offered the 3rd NKPA Division advancing from Yongdong an opportunity to outflank the 1st Cavalry Division. The 8th Cavalry, then in division reserve, counterattacked to restore the divisional boundary. The 27th Infantry also counterattacked and regained contact with the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry.<sup>66</sup>

The risk of the NKPA cutting off the American troops was not over. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry's Commanding Officer reported NKPA attempts to penetrate both the right and left flanks of the regiment's position throughout the day.<sup>67</sup> Reports suggested that the NKPA pushed civilians, as human shields, ahead of them during their attacks. The NKPA attacked the regiment frontally, but American artillery drove the North Koreans back with great success. Navy aircraft from the *USS Valley Forge* were directed into the area and attacked a railroad tunnel occupied by enemy forces and other targets forward of the 7th Cavalry in the direction of Yongdong with bombs and machine guns.<sup>68</sup>

The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 28 PIR described the preceding 24 hours as "relatively quiet" with some infantry probes of U.S. positions and "intermittent artillery fire" in the division's forward areas. The division's

intelligence staff estimated three NKPA battalions to the division's front with "a concentration of unknown strength on our left flank." Enemy combat efficiency and morale remained good, and the PIR concluded that the "enemy's main effort apparently is north of our line in the 27th Infantry ZR [Zone of Responsibility]. Indications still point to a build up on our left flank."<sup>69</sup>

To eliminate the growing threat of envelopment, the 7th Cavalry received orders at 8:30 PM to withdraw to the southeast at first light on July 29.<sup>70</sup> With the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, in the lead, the regiment passed through Hwanggan and occupied positions adjacent to the 5th Cavalry. This move did not occur without incident, however. Like the night of July 25-26, the regiment became confused and did not arrive in its new positions until sometime after 9:00 AM, even though the regiment had no contact with the enemy. Some indications suggest that this confusion represented another instance of poor coordination within the 7th Cavalry. The Operations Order called for the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, to have priority of movement. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, would travel over the railroad tracks behind the battalion's position and through the railroad tunnel into Hwanggan to join the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, already moving rearward on the road.<sup>71</sup> Apparently, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry left its positions before the 2nd Battalion and arrived in Hwanggan first, creating a traffic jam that delayed the regiment's progress.

Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 28 noted several developments in enemy tactics reported by the 25th Infantry Division. An unconfirmed report mentioned that NKPA soldiers used American uniforms to infiltrate U.S. lines. Several reports described NKPA units mounting frontal "banzai" attacks of 50 or more men to fix American units while other NKPA elements moved to envelop the American position. Finally, the 25th Infantry Division reported that during an enemy attack, a small group of NKPA soldiers offered to surrender. When the Americans ceased fire and moved forward to apprehend the enemy soldiers, a company-sized NKPA force concealed nearby attacked the American unit. Overall, the PIR evaluated the situation in the 1st Cavalry Division's zone as "stable;" however, the 25th Infantry Division to the north of the 1st Cavalry faced "aggressive attack [sic] combined with infiltration tactics." Eighth Army's estimate of the enemy's most likely course of action remained the same: the main effort moving along the Taejon-Kumchon axis, combined with a deep envelopment of the army's left flank and guerrilla action against the army's rear areas.<sup>72</sup>

## **XVII. July 29, 1950**

July 29 marked the withdrawal of the 7th Cavalry from the vicinity of No Gun Ri and the arrival of the NKPA in Hwanggan. The 1st Cavalry Division continued its phased withdrawal to the Naktong River. No friendly forces returned to this area until the September breakout from the Naktong River defenses.

The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 29 PIR reported some NKPA patrol activity in the division's zone during the last 24 hours but "no concerted pressure at any point." The PIR offered no estimate of the enemy's most likely course of action.<sup>73</sup>

A disturbing entry appeared in Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 29: the 25th Infantry Division reported that a soldier who escaped the ambush of his patrol had seen NKPA troops shooting wounded American soldiers they had captured. The PIR further reported some reduction in the NKPA 3rd Division's pressure against the 1st Cavalry Division's front but warned that aerial reconnaissance had revealed a large build-up in the vicinity of Chirye and south of the 1st Cavalry's new positions around Kumchon. Eighth Army evaluated this build-up as an effort by the NKPA 3rd Division to envelop the 1st Cavalry's left flank through a gap between the 1st Cavalry and the 24th Infantry Division to its south. However, Eighth Army now considered the Taejon-Kumchon axis as the NKPA's secondary effort; increasing pressure in the 24th Infantry Division's zone, particularly around Kochang and Hadong, suggested that the enemy's main effort had shifted to envelop Eighth Army's left flank coupled with increasing guerrilla activity in Eighth Army's rear areas.<sup>74</sup>

During the next 12 hours, little action occurred in the 1st Cavalry Division's zone; the division's 6:00 PM July 30 PIR reported only intermittent artillery fire, some sniping and tank fire, and a small patrol. Captured NKPA documents and aerial reconnaissance indicated two regiments to the division's front with a possible second division in the vicinity of Yongdong. The division intelligence staff concluded that the "enemy seems to be content to hold the ground gained with the probability of his building power to again start an envelopment of this division."<sup>75</sup>

Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 30 noted that no "significant attacks" occurred in the Kumchon area in the previous 24 hours. While many believed that a regiment in the vicinity of Chirye was attempting to outflank the 1st Cavalry Division, Eighth Army's intelligence staff felt that the NKPA had reduced its forces facing American and South Korean units in the Kumsong-Hamchang area and only intended to fix these units and not break through them. Instead, the NKPA used the forces redeployed from the Kumsong-Hamchang area to reinforce units conducting the deep envelopment of Eighth Army south of Taejon along the Chinju-Masan axis and in the vicinity of Kochang. The PIR warned that this effort to outflank Eighth Army, combined with continued pressure against South Korean units along the Yongju-Andong axis, "could provide the means for double envelopment of U.S. and ROK forces in the Yongdong-Hamchang area."<sup>76</sup>

The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 31 PIR reported intermittent mortar and artillery fire, some direct fire from tanks, and some patrol action. The NKPA made only one significant attack in company strength at dawn against the

7th Cavalry Regiment. The division intelligence staff noted that the enemy's infantry activity indicated "that they still [relied] predominantly on infiltration, surprise and light automatic weapons and do not press determined attacks against our strong points." The PIR continued to rate the enemy's combat efficiency and morale as good. As for NKPA intentions, the PIR reported that the enemy intended to envelop the division's northern flank and break through the 5th Cavalry Regiment on the division's southern flank to drive toward the Naktong River crossing site near Waegwan.<sup>77</sup>

The following days saw the continued, phased withdrawal of the entire Eighth Army back to the next defensible terrain: the Naktong River. The Eighth Army's PIRs proved remarkably accurate in spite of the fluid and dynamic enemy situation. This intelligence success allowed the Eighth Army's divisions to block effectively the threat of a NKPA flanking maneuver and therefore reach the Naktong to fight another day.

### **XVIII. U.S. Air Force Operations in July 1950**

One of the UN's few advantages was air power in the form of U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) assets. Fighters, bombers, fighter-bombers, transports, and reconnaissance aircraft helped to slow the North Korean advance. In fact, the UN air forces neutralized the North Korean air force and gained air superiority over South Korea and most of North Korea during the first month of the war. In addition to air superiority, UN tactical air power's other missions included interdicting North Korean supply lines and providing close air support for friendly ground forces, which required attacks on buildings, bridges, roads, and railroads. All types of vehicles and troops appeared as military targets both at the front and behind enemy lines. Beyond the constantly shifting bomb line, tactical air elements freely attacked interdiction targets without fear of hitting friendly forces. Pilots sometimes identified what appeared to be large groups of refugees, moving at their own risk in the combat zone, as enemy troops and supply carriers.<sup>78</sup>

As mentioned earlier, the North Koreans often used civilian refugees as human screens for patrols and flanking movements and as supply bearers. By July 26, 1950, stories abounded in the Air Force, the Army, and elsewhere about North Korean soldiers posing as civilians and infiltrating U.S. lines dressed in the traditional Korean white garb. Eighth Army refugee policies soon denied the refugees entry or allowed passage through the lines at specific times during the day. These directives further provided that the U.S. soldiers turned the refugees over to the South Korean National Police.<sup>79</sup>

## **XIX. Air-Ground Operations in July 1950**

A discussion of Air-Ground operations is important because the AP said in a December 29, 1999, article that U.S. jets attacked Korean civilians and the Korean witnesses stated that U.S. airplanes strafed them.

In July 1950, Field Manual (FM) 31-35 (dated August 1946) explained air-ground operations and the Tactical Air Control System that would manage these operations. FM 31-35 provided for a Joint Operations Center (JOC) manned by U.S. Army and Air Force intelligence and operations personnel. The Joint Operations Center received Army requests for air support and planned and ordered daily air operations. At the heart of the Joint Operations Center rested the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), which provided aircraft control and warning and directed all airborne activity. The Joint Operations Center also communicated with individual Forward Air Controllers (FAC) in the Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP). The TACPs, which operated on the ground, mobile and close to the front lines, directed the aircraft to targets.<sup>80</sup>

## **XX. The Joint Operations Center**

The first Korean War Joint Operations Center was established at Itazuke Air Base, Japan, on July 3, 1950. Later that month, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Advanced; the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing (FBW); the 8th Fighter-Bomber Group (FBG); and five F-80 fighter-bomber squadrons established their headquarters at this location. The Joint Operations Center deployed to Korea on July 6, co-locating with Headquarters, 24th Infantry Division, at Taejon. The first three Tactical Air Control Parties, each comprised of a forward air controller (a pilot), a radio operator, and a mechanic driver, began operating at Chonan on July 5, 1950. Their AN/VRC-1 radio system was mounted in the rear of a jeep. The AN/VRC-1 consisted of an SCR-193 High-Frequency radio for point-to-point contact and an SCR-522 VHF radio for air-to-ground contact. Radio performance suffered greatly from the bumpy roads, and the radios proved difficult to maintain. Furthermore, the High-Frequency (HF) radio could only range 30 miles.<sup>81</sup>

## **XXI. The Tactical Air Controller**

Air Force leadership soon determined that the Air Force needed another element to maintain effective contact between the Joint Operations Center and the Tactical Air Control Parties and to direct the F-80s to a target before the aircraft ran out of fuel. That component was the Airborne Tactical Air Controller, which, in the absence of enemy air opposition, could conduct tactical reconnaissance over the battlefield and immediate enemy rear areas and provide air-to-air direction for tactical aircraft arriving from Itazuke.<sup>82</sup>

A control team tested the L-5G liaison aircraft on July 9, 1950, but the aircraft proved too slow and its power generator fitted the SCR-522 airborne radios poorly. The next day, a T-6 with an eight-channel AN/ARC-3 radio worked successfully.<sup>83</sup> As the front squeezed in upon Taejon, the T-6s evacuated to Taegu on July 13 and fell under the 6132nd Tactical Air Control Squadron's command the following day. The Joint Operations Center followed in stages between July 14 and 19. Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Advanced, moved from Itazuke to Taegu on July 23 and set up headquarters adjacent to Headquarters, Eighth Army.<sup>84</sup> This arrangement allowed Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker (Eighth Army) and Major General Earl E. Partridge (Fifth Air Force), and their respective staffs, to communicate target requests and generally manage the air campaign better. This arrangement permitted face-to-face discussions of sensitive matters instead of communicating via paper.

On July 24, the 6132nd Tactical Air Control Group (re-designated from squadron status two days earlier) assumed control of the Tactical Air Control Center; the Tactical Air Control Parties; and, for a short period, the airborne controllers, who, beginning on July 15, were called Mosquitoes.<sup>85</sup> On August 1, 1950, the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron (TCS), Airborne, was established at Taegu under the operational control of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Advanced, to operate the T-6s.<sup>86</sup> Thus, by July 26, 1950, the fundamental components of the Tactical Air Control System existed: the JOC (call sign Angelo); the TACC (call sign Mellow or Mellow Control); at least six Tactical Air Control Parties (call signs Angelo Queen, Mike, Love, X-Ray, Yoke and Zebra); and eight combat-ready T-6s (call signs Mosquito Able, Baker, Charlie, Dog, Jig, King, and Uncle).

A critical point to note is that an ordinary ground soldier could not talk directly to a T-6 and request an air strike. Only the Tactical Air Control Party with the jeep-mounted AN/VRC-1 radios could talk to the Mosquito or an F-80. At best, the infantry or cavalry soldier only carried a hand-held "walkie-talkie" radio or the larger backpack SCR-300 radio. To request an air strike, an Army unit, usually at the battalion level or higher, passed a request up through Army channels to the Joint Operations Center; the Joint Operations Center would validate the request and pass it to the Tactical Air Control Center (Mellow). This process included Mellow checking with the deployed Tactical Air Control Parties, Mosquitoes, and Army spotters to acknowledge the target and direct the next available F-80s, F-51s, or Navy aircraft to attack the target. This procedure was slow. A moving target could easily have vanished between the time a ground soldier reported something and an aircraft arrived.<sup>87</sup> Sometime in mid-August 1950, the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron began installing SCR-300 radios in some of the T-6s on a test basis. Although this experiment worked, talking directly with ground units still remained difficult.<sup>88</sup> In an interview, a former 1st Cavalry Division Army Liaison pilot stated that he could talk to the Division G-3 but could not communicate with the ground forces. He did state that on one occasion he communicated with them by dropping a "message sack."

## XXII. Tactical Air Operations on July 26, 1950

At 25/1359Z July 1950, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Advanced, issued Operation Order (OPORD) 24-50 for July 26, covering all forces under its operational control, to include B-26, RF-80, F-51, T-6, and F-80 aircraft. Some specific targets were designated, and B-29 operating areas were identified. In addition to orders to conduct armed and visual reconnaissance of Taejon, Hamyang, and Yongju; escort B-26s; conduct weather reconnaissance; and provide area fighter support for B-29s, the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing provided close support missions as directed by Mellow. The first flight arrived in the target area by first light followed by other flights at 15-minute intervals.<sup>89</sup>

At 5:35 AM local time on July 26, the Fighter-Bomber Wing issued its fragmentary order (FRAGO, or implementing order) for the 26th. The FRAGO outlined a B-26 escort mission; the strafing of an airfield at Konan as mentioned in the operations order and provisions for strip alert (S/A); the employment of Combat Air Patrols (CAP); and nighttime activities for the F-82s; in addition, the FRAGO identified takeoff times and intervals for the F-80 units to provide close-support missions.<sup>90</sup> An examination of the F-80 mission summary reports for July 26 shows that the missions flown match the missions scheduled.<sup>91</sup>

The Air Force History Team found mission summary reports for four (8th, 9th, and 35th Fighter-Bomber Squadrons, and the 39th Fighter Interceptor Squadron) of the five F-80 squadrons flying on 26 July 1950.<sup>92</sup> For the fifth squadron (80th Fighter-Bomber Squadron), the team found handwritten materials providing mission numbers, flying times, and target areas. The 36th Fighter-Bomber Squadron did not fly on July 26.<sup>93</sup> The F-80s carried six .50-caliber machine guns and two or four five-inch, high-velocity aerial rockets (HVAR). At this time, F-80s could not carry bombs or napalm from Japan because of fuel limitations.<sup>94</sup> The primary mission of the F-80s and the F-82s in the Fifth Air Force was the air defense of Japan. As of mid-July 1950, two F-80 squadrons (the 7th Fighter-Bomber Squadron and 41st Fighter Interceptor Squadron) and one F-82 squadron (339th Fighter Interceptor Squadron) remained with the air defense and training missions in northern and central Japan.<sup>95</sup> The need for better ground attack aircraft led the Air Force to convert some squadrons back to the propeller-driven F-51s from the jet-propelled F-80s. At that time the F-51s could carry bombs and fly from Korean bases. The 40th Fighter Interceptor Squadron converted to F-51s on July 16 and deployed to Pohang on the east coast of Korea. The 39th Fighter Interceptor Squadron followed on August 7.<sup>96</sup>

The sector of primary interest for this report is the central front, where the North Koreans were driving down the main railroad from Taejon toward Taegu. Taejon fell on July 20 and the North Koreans took Yongdong on July 25. The UN held the next significant town on the rail line, Hwanggan, until July 29.<sup>97</sup> Thus, one of the key targets on July 26 was Yongdong and any North Korean forces



moving through that location. (See U.S. Air Force Mission Diagram and Charts in Appendix E.)

Most of the missions could contact Mellow upon arriving over Korea. Many were handed off once or twice to a Mosquito controller, a Tactical Air Control Party, or an Army air spotter. On July 26, those missions contacting Dragon Fly, the 24th Infantry Division air spotter, occurred in the 24th Division area to the south of the 1st Cavalry Division area. Some aircraft found no targets. Most missions went to Taejon, Yongju, and Tanyang in the north or Hadong in the south. Most of those aircraft that flew to Yongdong either hit the town or proceeded north, west, or south. However, the 8th Fighter-Bomber Squadron's Mission #2 strafed vehicles one mile east of Yongdong around 7:00 AM on July 26. The 8th Fighter-Bomber Squadron's mission #11 strafed a double railroad tunnel west of Yongdong around 5:00 PM on July 26. The 39th Fighter-Bomber Squadron's mission #11 at 8:00 PM on July 26 reported a tank and three trucks damaged east of Yongdong. The team found no information on 80th Fighter-Bomber Squadron Mission #7, which may have gone to Yongdong around 2:00 PM on July 26. None of the F-80 mission reports on July 26 mention observing or strafing a large group of people in white clothing.<sup>98</sup>

Of the three F-51 units, specific reports exist only on the Royal Australian Air Force No. 77 Squadron. This squadron flew two missions of four aircraft each. The first mission was primarily an escort mission for B-26s charged with bombing pontoon bridges across the Han River near Seoul. After completing the escort mission, the F-51s, armed with .50-caliber machine guns and five-inch rockets, contacted Mellow, who steered them to Chongsan to attack various targets. One of the aircraft contacted Mosquito Jig, who directed the plane to targets north of Yongsang-Ni. Mellow directed the second mission, also four F-51s with machine guns and rockets only, to strafe roads west and north of Namwon up to Taejon. Very few targets were visible. After landing at Taegu and refueling, the four F-51s became airborne again; Mellow vectored them to Yongju. They then flew to Tanyang and Punggi before returning to Iwakuni.<sup>99</sup>

The 40th Fighter Interceptor Squadron of the 35th Fighter Interceptor Group, operating out of Pohang on the east coast, almost fought a separate war in supporting the ROK forces against attacks south from Yongdok toward Pohang. OPOD 24-50 gave the 40th the authority to use all of its aircraft on the east coast. Some "three-hour" intelligence reports describe 16 F-51 missions from Pohang mostly to Yongdok, Yonju, and Tanyang.<sup>100</sup> No mission reports were available. The mission report section of Fifth Air Force intelligence issued the "Three-Hour Report" at three-hour intervals. This report provided brief results of missions flown during the previous three hours based upon the exit information provided to Mellow by aircraft leaving the combat area. Many of these reports match the mission reports completed by the squadron intelligence officer after debriefing the pilots. In the absence of mission reports for the two U.S. F-51 squadrons and the totaling of all sorties by type of aircraft in summaries such as

the recapitulation report, the three-hour reports provided the only source available to differentiate mission results from K-2 and K-3 in Korea and Itazuke air base in Japan.

The Air Force History Team located a few three-hour reports for July 26, on the 51st Fighter Squadron (Provisional) at Taegu but found no mission reports. The 51st flew at least 10 missions. One morning mission and two late afternoon missions occurred in the Yongdong area on July 26. During one of the late afternoon missions, three F-51s dropped four 500-pound napalm bombs in the Yongdong area.<sup>101</sup> The three-hour reports also indicate that before dawn on July 26, an F-82 on a night intruder mission dropped two napalm bombs on Mangyong. One bomb was a dud.<sup>102</sup>

In addition to the absence of mission reports for the two F-51 units, the Air Force researchers could find no reports for the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron T-6s. This unit did not exist formally until August 1 although the T-6s flew from 10 July onward. Mission reports exist from November 1, 1950, when the squadron became a group. Nonetheless, the daily "Final Recapitulation-Summary of Air Operations" report for July 26, 1950, issued by Headquarters, Fifth Air Force intelligence, does not identify any targets struck that day anywhere near No Gun Ri.<sup>103</sup>

### **XXIII. Friendly Fire Incident on July 27, 1950**

An event that might bear on the alleged incident in the vicinity of No Gun Ri concerns a friendly fire incident that occurred in the Hwanggan area on July 27; an F-80 accidentally strafed the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment's command post at 7:15 AM, prompting the regimental commander to request that a TACP be assigned immediately.<sup>104</sup> This location is approximately 500 meters east of the double railroad overpass and 100 meters south-southeast of the single railroad overpass. A Fifth Air Force ADVON message acknowledged that the plane was an F-80 from one of the 35th FBS's first three missions of the day (call sign Contour).<sup>105</sup> The 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing fragmentary order for July 27, 1950<sup>106</sup> matched the F-80 squadron mission summary reports; the requirements and take-off times agreed with each other.<sup>107</sup> Given the timing of the day's missions, only the three missions flown by the 35th Fighter-Bomber Squadron with take-off times between 0600K and 0640K could have flown in the target area at 0715K (K, or Kilo, time represents local time in Korea). A weather reconnaissance flight to Korea from the 36th Fighter-Bomber Squadron (Mission 36-1) took off from Itazuke, Japan, at 0545K but returned at 0720K. The first of the 0700 flights, Mission 39-2, took off at 0710K and did not arrive in Korea until 0735K. Mission 39-1 was a strip alert scramble that occurred at 0755K.<sup>108</sup>

The Final Mission Summary Reports for July 27, indicated that Mission 35-1, Contour George, flew in the Yongdong-Hwanggan area while 35-2, Contour Roger, and 35-3, Contour William, flew elsewhere. The four F-80s of Mission 35-

1 departed Itazuke at 0600K. They contacted Mellow over Taejon and destroyed a flak emplacement hidden in a damaged C-47 sitting on the Taejon airfield. Pineapple Control (an Army L-5 or L-17 from the 1st Cavalry Division) then directed Mission 35-1 to Yongdong, and the four planes flew up the road northeast toward Hwanggan without incident.<sup>109</sup> The pilots reported seeing U.S. artillery firing into Hwanggan, but they were mistaken because the town remained in U.S. hands for a few more days. At least one F-80 strafed a "wooden area into which many vehicle tracks were leading", probably the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry's command post. The strafing destroyed two trucks but claimed no lives.<sup>110</sup>

#### **XXIV. Strafing and Civilians**

On July 25, 1950, Colonel Turner C. Rogers sent a memorandum, subject: Policy on Strafing Civilians, to his immediate superior, Brigadier General Edward J. Timberlake, Vice Commander of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Advanced (ADVON) (Korea).<sup>111</sup> In his memorandum, which was not an order, Colonel Rogers mentioned that the Army requested that the Air Force strafe all civilian refugee parties that approached the Army's positions. He pointed out that air operations involving the strafing "of civilians is sure to receive wide publicity and may cause embarrassment to the U.S. Air Force and to the U.S. government in its relation with the United Nations." Rogers argued that the refugee issue was primarily an Army problem and that the Army should screen civilians as they came through the lines. He further recommended that Fifth Air Force aircraft not attack refugee groups unless they were "definitely known to contain North Korean soldiers or [to] commit hostile acts."<sup>112</sup> No reply to the memorandum or comment exists in the files. A notation on the copy found in the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) implies that General Timberlake saw the memorandum and referred it to public relations.

A similar statement was found in a Navy document describing operations conducted on July 25, 1950:

Several groups of fifteen to twenty people dressed in white were sighted. The first group was strafed in accordance with information received from the Army that groups of more than eight to ten people were to be considered troops, and were to be attacked. Since the first pass indicated that the people seemed to be civilians, other groups were investigated by non-firing runs.<sup>113</sup>

Since both the Rogers's memorandum and this document are dated July 25, 1950, it is most likely that they were referencing a single discussion in the Joint Operations Center, where both USAF and USN operations officers were co-located. The Navy statement reinforces the judgment that pilots were expected

to exercise between selecting targets and the Army's desire to target NKPA troops wearing white, not noncombatants.

Colonel Rogers, a 37-year-old West Point graduate with fourteen years of Air Force service, completed the Air War College in June 1950 and became available for an assignment to the new Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Advanced. He arrived in mid-July 1950 and was assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, just before the advanced headquarters deployed from Itazuke to Taegu.<sup>114</sup> On March 13, 2000, the Air Force Inspector General representative interviewed Major General Turner C. Rogers, USAF (Retired), the author of this memorandum. General Rogers could offer no further information on the document in question.<sup>115</sup>

In interviews with USAF combat pilots who flew in Korea during July-August 1950, the pilots stated that their orders were to confirm their targets as military or hostile before firing. Their attack priorities were tanks, trucks, and buildings. None of these individuals recall being given orders to strafe any civilian refugee parties that were approaching Army positions. A thorough search of all available records failed to produce any requests made by the Army to the Air Force or the Navy asking them to conduct operations against known refugees as described in the July 25, 1950, Rogers memorandum or the USS Valley Forge Intelligence Summary of the same date.<sup>116</sup>

On August 5, 1950, the 12th Fighter-Bomber Squadron replaced the 51st Fighter Squadron (Provisional) at Taegu. This organization supplied most of the pilots and aircraft deployed to Taegu in mid-July and became known as the Dallas Project. The Air Force History Team found two examples of how these F-51 pilots felt about, and dealt with, the prospect of strafing civilians.

Lieutenant Duane E. Biteman patrolled the Naktong river line. He had very general instructions not to let refugees cross the river into the Pusan perimeter. For a "couple of hours," he made low passes along the river, firing warning bursts into the river shallows to force the refugees away from the river and hoping that they would not cross and force him to shoot.<sup>117</sup>

In another incident, a Forward Air Controller directed the squadron commander, Major Harry Moreland, and his wingman, Captain Daniel James, to a large number of enemy troops moving down the road. Upon inspecting this group, Moreland and James saw mostly women and children and did not attack.<sup>118</sup>

In addition, some of the Australian pilots of No. 77 Squadron felt troubled at shooting people in white clothing. But when the Mosquito Forward Air Controllers assured the Australian pilots that the targets were legitimate and would blow up when hit, the pilots attacked. "It's a gut wrenching business," said Australian pilot John Flemming.<sup>119</sup>

## **XXV. Imagery**

As part of the research effort, the Air Force History Team searched for tactical reconnaissance and gun camera film. The Team found 8th TRS film of the No Gun Ri area dated August 6 and September 19, 1950. Some patterns are apparent near the tracks. A National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) photo interpreter maintains that these patterns show “an imagery signature of probable strafing.”<sup>120</sup> However, the Air Force Team showed this film to four retired photo interpreters of national reputation. All of them agree that the film shows no signs of bombing or strafing on the railroad tracks.<sup>121</sup>

The USAF History office consulted several photo analysts of national reputation, the first analyst found “no evident [sic] of strafing” on the larger pattern and “no apparent strafing damage” on the smaller pattern. The second analyst, the author of three books on World War II photo analysis, saw “no sign of strafing” on the large pattern and “no sign of . . . ground disturbance suggesting strafing” on the smaller pattern. The third analyst, who had been the senior Air Force instructor at the Department of Defense Advanced Imagery Interpretation School, saw “no evidence of strafing” in either pattern. The fourth analyst, whose photo-analyst career encompassed teaching, Special Operations, and various international assignments, found “no evidence or any indication of strafing by either cannon or machine-gun” on the larger pattern and “no evidence of strafing damage” on the smaller pattern.<sup>122</sup>

A thorough investigation of the Air Force's role during this period of the Korean War yielded no evidence to suggest that Air Force aircraft strafed Korean refugees or enemy soldiers at, or near, No Gun Ri on July 26, 1950. In fact, no evidence of any Air Force activity in the vicinity of No Gun Ri exists. The Air Force Team did not find all mission reports for the 80th Fighter-Bomber Squadron or the T-6 Mosquitoes, which leaves three missions of the 80th Fighter-Bomber Squadron at midday for which we cannot account. However, the final Fifth Air Force recapitulation report for operations on July 26, 1950 shows no target struck in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on the 26th, and the imagery analysis shows no evidence as well.

## **XXVI. U.S. Navy Air Operations in July 1950**

Naval air power played a potentially relevant role in the fighting during this period as well, but no evidence exists that suggests that U.S. Naval aircraft willfully attacked civilian targets. Attack Squadron Fifty-Five (VA-55) and Fighter Squadron Fifty-Three (VF-53) participated in air operations during the last week of July 1950. Both squadrons deployed aboard *Valley Forge* (CV 45) as part of Carrier Air Group Five (CVG-5) from 1 May through December 1, 1950. Other squadrons deployed as a part of CVG-5 that could have participated in air operations near No Gun Ri were VF-51, VF-52, VF-55, Composite Squadron 3 Detachment C (VC-3 Det C), and VC-11.<sup>123</sup>

A thorough study of the command histories and after-action reports held by the Naval Historical Center indicates that these squadrons also did not participate near No Gun Ri. Yet several documents provided some insight into close air support mission management and illustrated the priority placed on developing an effective command-and-control network.

The available archival records recount problems employing air assets to support the ground troops from the very beginning. On July 22, 1950, this challenge was evident when carrier-based aircraft “were placed under the airborne control of the 5<sup>th</sup> AF while in support of ground forces in Korea.”<sup>124</sup> On July 25 the results of the July 22 Navy missions were summarized in a memorandum to General Partridge, Commanding General, Headquarters, Fifth Advance, K-2, by noting that “the Navy had been unable on the 22d [July] to make contact with your control [Air Force].”<sup>125</sup>

As a part of the working solution documented in the CINCPACFLT [Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet] *Interim Report of Korean No. 1* on July 28, 1950, the Navy sent “a liaison officer to JOC [Joint Operations Center], 5<sup>th</sup> AF [Air Force] to arrange assignment of naval aircraft to specified forward air controllers (airborne).”<sup>126</sup> The stated purpose of the liaison was to develop joint command-and-control procedures for the Army, Air Force, and Navy.

## **XXVII. Naval Air Mission Targeting Guidance**

Naval air mission targeting guidance for the last week of July varied widely from clearly defined objectives to somewhat general targeting suggestions. Stronger, more precise guidance gave “instructions to hit bridges, columns of troops, tanks, and any other assembly which looks as if it might be military.”<sup>127</sup> Other documented guidance is available in the *Valley Forge* Report of Operations that indicated that “the target area assigned was designated ‘free Navy opportunity area’ since facilities on the ground for close troop support were not made available to Navy planes. Principal targets were enemy troops, armor and vehicles, rolling stock, barge traffic and lines of communication.”<sup>128</sup> Attacks against readily identifiable military targets were a priority.

Identifying non-personnel military targets proved relatively easy. However, the existing tactical situation called for targeting ground forces, which proved more difficult. Non-combatant civilians often commingled with enemy combatants, and pilots struggled to distinguish enemy troops based upon clothing.

Two particular situations illustrate how the Navy relied on the judgment of its pilots as these pilots evaluated targets as hostile or friendly. On July 25, after an initial attack against ground contacts, “the first pass indicated that the people seemed to be civilians[;] other groups were investigated by non-firing runs.”<sup>129</sup> Three days later the *Valley Forge* Operations Report noted that, “as on previous

days, pilots saw groups of people in white shirts, apparently working in the fields, but paying no attention to the planes.”<sup>130</sup> Pilots deemed these groups as civilian and not openly hostile. The pilots did not attack.

Both the interim evaluation report and the *Valley Forge* Operations Report contain observations on weapons loading for specific aircraft. From the operations report, “the most practical close support load for the ADs was 1-500# GP, 1-220# fragmentation bomb and 1 napalm bomb plus a maximum number of HVARs or 100# GP. The F4Us carried a 500# bomb or napalm and maximum HVARs [High-Velocity Air Rockets] or 100# GP. All aircraft carried a maximum load [sic] of 20mm ammunition at a ratio of 1 HEI, 1 AP and 1 incendiary. The ADs were loaded with 2000# GP and 1000# GP on occasions when specific targets called for those types of explosives.”<sup>131</sup> Expanding on that general description, the interim evaluation provided further details on ordnance loading:<sup>132</sup>

| Ordnance/Aircra<br>ft | 20mm<br>cannon | Bombs                  | Rockets         |
|-----------------------|----------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| <u>F4U</u>            |                |                        |                 |
| Load Able             | 800 rds        | 1x1000#                | 8-5”HVAR        |
| Load Baker            | 800 rds        | 2x150gals<br>(Napalm)  | 8-5” HVAR       |
| <u>AD</u>             |                |                        |                 |
| Load Able             | 400 rds        | 3x500#                 | 12-5” HVAR      |
| Load Baker            | 400 rds        | 3x150 gals<br>(Napalm) | 12-250#<br>Frag |
| Load Charlie          | 400 rds        | 2x1000#                | 12-250#<br>Frag |

As far as ship positioning, the *Valley Forge* Report of Operations describes air wing operations on July 25 and 26 from a position about 30 miles southeast of Pohang. On July 28 and 29, the air wing operated off the west coast of Korea from an unspecified location.<sup>133</sup>

### XXIII. Naval Air Mission Planning

As reflected in after-action summaries, missions during the last week of July were planned carefully. The action summary for July 26 stated that: “The missions for the various [aircraft] divisions were a result of information [presumably intelligence] concerning enemy dispositions issued by the Army and Air Force at Taegu last night. Tactical Air Control parties based in Korea established communication with the strike planes and assigned the various targets in and near the North Korea front lines.”<sup>134</sup> In missions applying that planning factor, the VA-55 history report indicated that attacks “destroyed seventy percent (70%) of the village of Yongdong, minor damage to a railway

bridge at Yongdong and many enemy troops destroyed.”<sup>135</sup> The *Valley Forge* Operations Summary offered more detail: “Still on call to the TAC, the planes dropped 7 500#, 20 100#, 21 HVARs (High Velocity Air Rocket) on a small town 7-8 miles NNE of Yongdong” (No Gun Ri is seven miles east-northeast of Yongdong. This location is not in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. There are numerous villages north-northeast of Yongdong at a range of seven to eight miles.).<sup>136</sup> “Four ADs (Skyraiders), directed to “wipe out” Yongdong, hit the town with napalm, leaving it burning fiercely.”<sup>137</sup> From the action summary for July 28, the report details a close air support mission in which “four ADs reported to TAC and Yongdong, where he (the pilot) explained that the first tunnel north of the city was occupied by enemy troops, the second one north by friendlies. Four napalm hits were put into the tunnel, after which large quantities of black smoke issued from the ends. This target is evaluated as damaged with countless loss of lives.”<sup>138</sup> The operations report further details attacks on other villages near Yongdong but without sufficient detail to determine the exact location.

A thorough analysis of the available Navy air activity documentation yields a picture of competent Navy air planners working closely with their Army and Air Force counterparts to fight the war as efficiently and effectively as possible. The military leadership, down to the individual pilot, recognized fully the presence of civilians in the war zone, and leaders at each level of command acted to avoid engaging these non-combatants. No evidence exists that shows that Navy aircraft willfully attacked civilian targets.

## **XXIX. Conclusion**

This focused discussion on the intelligence, ground combat, and air operations of late July 1950 outlines the events based upon all currently available archival and secondary-source evidence. The battlefield between Yongdong and Hwanggan remained a very fluid place from July 25 to July 29. Unfortunately, both sides met on a complex battlefield rife with the natural obstacles of war: civilians, villages, and road and rail networks. The U.S. maintained a reasonably accurate and informed intelligence picture of the enemy, but the NKPA tactic of infiltrating enemy soldiers dressed as civilian refugees behind U.S. lines truly challenged the soldiers' ability to distinguish friend from foe. U.S. soldiers new to combat and to the country encountered a war unlike the one fought barely five years earlier in World War II. Guerilla-type tactics reigned, and the threat existed everywhere, even behind friendly lines. Rumors carried great weight among the Soldiers, and the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, showed the effects of such hearsay when they withdrew on the night of July 25 in disarray and not in enemy contact. The air war over Korea played an important role in the Eighth Army's daily operations. However, the only documented air strike in the immediate vicinity of Hwanggan area occurred northeast of No Gun Ri on July 27 and damaged the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment's command post but wounded no one. The Navy discovered no evidence of naval aircraft operating in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on July 26 or 27. On July 28, Navy aircraft from the *USS Valley Forge* were



directed into the area and attacked a railroad tunnel occupied by enemy forces and other targets forward of the 7th Cavalry in the direction of Yongdong with bombs and machine guns. These available facts help to paint a clearer, more informed picture of the events in those crucial first days of the U.S. military's involvement in the Korean War.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> War Department Field Manual 30-5, *Military Intelligence: Combat Intelligence* (Washington: War Department, February 1946), 8. The next revision of FM 30-5 was published in 1951.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, 13.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, 70-71.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, 8.

<sup>5</sup> John Patrick Finnegan and Romana Danysh, *Military Intelligence* (Washington: Center of Military History, 1998), 111-113. Two unofficial post-war publications, intended for officers with little or no intelligence experience assigned to intelligence positions, were Colonel Stedman Chandler and Colonel Robert W. Robb, *Front-Line Intelligence* (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), and Robert R. Glass and Philip B. Davidson, *Intelligence Is For Commanders* (Harrisburg, Penn: Military Service Publishing Company, 1948). On inadequate training in patrolling, see Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, "Report of the First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command," 16 August 1950, Appendix C-2, copy in File 091 Korea (23 Aug 50), Box 558, Chief of Staff Decimal File 1950, Record Group 319, NARA; "Some Infantry Lessons From Korea," (n.d., but from internal evidence probably 1952), 7-8, copy in File Geog V Korea 321 Infantry, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.

<sup>6</sup> "Report of the First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command," Appendix C; "Comments of the Chief of Army Field Forces on Section II, Conclusions, and Section III, Recommendations, of Report of First Office, Chief of Army Field Forces' Observer Team to the Far East Command, 16 August 1950," 1-2, enclosure to letter, 28 August 1950, General Mark W. Clark to General J. Lawton Collins, File 350.07 Far East, Army Intelligence Project Decimal File 1949-1950, Box 128, RG 319, NARA; Matthew M. Aid, "US Humint and Comint in the Korea; From the Approach of War to the Chinese Intervention," *Intelligence and National Security*, v.14, no.4 (Winter 1999), 27, 45. The quote is from Comments of the Chief of Army Field Forces," 2.

<sup>7</sup> Aid, "US Humint and Comint in the Korean War," 19-27, 30-41. On American war planning, see Steven T. Ross, *American War Plans, 1945-1950* (New York: Garland, 1988).

<sup>8</sup> Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, "G-2 Monthly Narrative for 25 June to 31 July 1950," 1 August 1950, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA; Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), "Standard Operating Procedure: Intelligence," 10 July 1950, File Oper Rpt 1950-51, Box 7, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, RG 338. The division's intelligence SOP was firmly grounded in FM 30-5; 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Annex B (Intelligence) to Operations Order 9-50, 22 0700-K July 1950, copy in 1st Cavalry Division July 1950 War Diary, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA.

<sup>9</sup> "G-2 Monthly Narrative for 25 June to 31 July 1950;" Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #7, 2400 19 July 1950, File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950, Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

<sup>10</sup> Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), War Diary July 1950, Entry for 18 and 19 July 1950, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

<sup>11</sup> Most of the various sources used by army and division intelligence staffs to develop their analyses are noted in the Periodic Intelligence Reports these staffs produced. For communications intelligence, see Aid, 45-48. Doctrine concerning sources is in FM 30-5, 25-31.

<sup>12</sup> FM 30-5, 75-77.

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<sup>13</sup> Headquarters Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, "History of the North Korean Army," July 1952, 56-58, 74-75, 79-80 (copy in File Geog V Korea 314.7 North Korean Army, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.); Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Nakdong, North to the Yalu* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), 263; "Report of the First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command," 8.

<sup>14</sup> Appleman, *South to the Nakdong, North to the Yalu*, 210-213.

<sup>15</sup> Table of Organization and Equipment No. 7-11N, 21 April 1948, Department of the Army.

<sup>16</sup> Letter, Douglas MacArthur, 15 November 1957, sub: Manuscript South to the Nakdong. In Records of the Army Staff, Box 747, RG 319, NARA.

<sup>17</sup> War diary, 1st Cavalry Division, 25 June-November 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Military Historian's Office, Organizational History Files, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

<sup>18</sup> War diary, 1st Cavalry Division, June-July 1950. In the Records of U. S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 131, RG 338, NARA.

<sup>19</sup> Letter, Headquarters III Corps, 24 August 1953, sub: Manuscript South to the Nakdong. In Records of the Army Staff, Box 746, RG 319, NARA.

<sup>20</sup> War diary, 24th Infantry Division, 12-13 July 1950. In the Records of U. S. Army Commands, Infantry Divisions 1940-1967, 24th ID, Box 528, RG 338, NARA.

<sup>21</sup> War diary, 8th Cavalry Division, July 1950. In the Records of U. S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 65, RG 338, NARA.

<sup>22</sup> "United States Army in the Korean War: The Medics' War," by Albert E. Cowdrey. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1990.

<sup>23</sup> Letter, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), 1 August 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Division 1940-967, Box 34, RG 338, NARA.

<sup>24</sup> "G-2 Monthly Narrative for 25 June to 31 July 1950;" Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #7, 2400 19 July 1950, File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950, Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

<sup>25</sup> Serial Number 28, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division July 1950 Journal, copy in 1st Cavalry Division July 1950 War Diary, Cavalry Divisions 1960-1967, Box 54, RG 338, NARA.

<sup>26</sup> War diary summary, 1st Cavalry Division, 25 June-November 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1st Cavalry Division War Diary, 1950, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

<sup>27</sup> Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #9, 2400 21 July 1950, File 319.1 (PIR July) Security Classified General Correspondence 1950, Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

<sup>28</sup> 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Annex B (Intelligence) to Operations Order 9-50, 22 0700-K July 1950, copy in 1st Cavalry Division July 1950 War Diary, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA.

<sup>29</sup> Activities report, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Inf), July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA.

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- <sup>30</sup> War diary summary, 1st Cavalry Division, 25 June-November 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1st Cavalry Division War Diary, 1950, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.
- <sup>31</sup> War diary journal, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 18-30 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.
- <sup>32</sup> Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #1, 1800 22 July 1950, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 45, RG 338, NARA.
- <sup>33</sup> Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #10, 2400 22 July 1950, File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950, Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.
- <sup>34</sup> War diary, 1st Cavalry Division, 25 June-November 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Military Historian's Office, Organizational History Files, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.
- <sup>35</sup> War diary journal, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 18-30 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.
- <sup>36</sup> Periodic operations report, 1st Cavalry Division, 23 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army commands, 1st Cavalry Division 1940-1967, Box 56, RG 338, NARA.
- <sup>37</sup> Activities report, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Inf), July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA.
- <sup>38</sup> Activities report, Headquarters 545 Military Police Company, 5 August 1950. In the records of Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4406, RG 407, NARA.
- <sup>39</sup> Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #2, 1800 23 July 1950, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 45, RG 338, NARA.
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- <sup>42</sup> Operations plan, 1st Cavalry Division, 24 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army commands, 1st Cavalry Division 1940-1967, Box 55, RG 338, NARA.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>44</sup> War diary summary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), June-July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>46</sup> Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #3, 1800 24 July 1950, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 45, RG 338, NARA.
- <sup>47</sup> Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #12, 2400 24 July 1950, File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950, Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

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- <sup>51</sup> Joint Message Form, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 26 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1st Cavalry Division 1940-1967, Box 55, RG 338, NARA.
- <sup>52</sup> War diary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), 25 June-31 July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.
- <sup>53</sup> War diary summary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), June-July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.
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<sup>70</sup> War diary summary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), June-July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

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<sup>85</sup> Hist 5AF, Vol. I, Chap. III, p. 25; Hist 6147 TCS (A), Jul 50, p. 7; 5AF Combat Operations History, 25 Jun-31 Oct 50.

<sup>86</sup> Hist 5AF, Vol. I, Chap. III, p. 27; Hist 6147 TCS (A), Aug 50, p. 1; 5AF ADV GO 12, 29 Jul 50.

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<sup>90</sup> Msg, COMFTRBOMWG 8 to COMFTRBOMGP 8, et al, OPR 319G, 26/0535K, Jul 50.

<sup>91</sup> "List of F-80 Sorties for 26 Jul 50," Mar 2000; Computer List "F-80 Sorties 26 July 1950," 28 Jul 2000, 27 pages.

<sup>92</sup> "Fighter-Bomber Final Mission Summary (FEAF Intel Form #5)," Reports, either the original handwritten forms or teletype copies, for the 8 and 9 FBS and the 39 FIS exist in Archives II RG 342, Mission Reports, boxes 9, 15 and 22. Typed facsimiles of the 35 FBS Reports are included

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in the 35 FBS history for Jul 50 located at AFHRA and available at AFHSO on microfilm roll K0487.

<sup>93</sup> 80 FBS mission data for 26 Jul 50 partially reconstructed from working papers found in Archives II, RG 342, 5AF OA Files, Box RD 3564.

<sup>94</sup> Air Materiel Command, "USAF Standard Aircraft Characteristics," MCRE Report No. 2, amended through 22 Dec 50.

<sup>95</sup> Hist 5AF, Vol. III, Chap. I; Hist Study #71, p. 14; Msg, COMAF FIVE to COMFTRWG 35, et al, OPS 1882, 16/2335Z, Jul 50.

<sup>96</sup> Hist Study #71, p. 20; Msg, 5AFHQADV to 35FTRGP, ADV631, 10/0151Z, Jul 50; Msg, COMAF 5, to ADV HQ FAF, OPR 1831, 12/1056Z, Jul 50; Memo, L/G G.E. Stratemeyer, CG FEAF, to M/G E.E. Partridge, CG 5AF, 23 Aug 50, with 1 attachment, paper on Pohang by Col. R.W. Whitty, CO K-3, 17 Aug 50, Document 26. Hereafter to be cited as "Whitty Paper."

<sup>97</sup> Appleman, p. 196-205; ROK MOND HIST, vol. IV, chap. VII, pp. 145-152; Melbourne C. Chandler, "Of Gary Owen in Glory," 1960, pp. 245-248.

<sup>98</sup> Computer generated map, "Yongdong, South Korea, F-80 Sorties - July 26, 1950," See Appendix E.

<sup>99</sup> Ltr, Exec., Historical Records (Air Force), Air Force HQ, Dept. of Defense, Australia, to Chief, Training Branch, IG, DA, US, 2000/1566 Pt. 1, 29 Feb 2000, with 2 attachments, No. 77 Squadron RAAF Unit History Sheet, Detail of Operations and Narrative [Combat] Reports, July 1950.

<sup>100</sup> Msg, COMAF FIVE ADV to JOC, et al, ADV-B-129, 25/1359Z, Jul 50, Document 16; Whitty Paper, Document 26; 5AF Intelligence "Three Hour Report," for K-3 (Pohang) for 26 Jul 50 for 0900K, 1200K, 1500K, 1800K and 2100K.

<sup>101</sup> 5AF Intelligence "Three Hour Report," for K-2 (Taegu) for 26 Jul 50 for 0900K (2), 1200K, 1500K, 1800K (2) and 2100K.

<sup>102</sup> 5AF Intelligence "Three Hour Report," 26/0600K/July 1950 (Itazuke).

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<sup>104</sup> HQ, 7th Cavalry (Infantry) War Diary, June-July 1950, in the records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949 - 1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

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<sup>107</sup> 80 FBS mission data for 26 Jul 50 partially reconstructed from working papers found in Archives II, RG 342, 5AF OA Files, Box RD 3564; 36 FBS Mission Summary Reports are located on AFHRA microfilm roll K0488. The 80th FBS did not fly on 27 July 1950; "List of F-80 Sorties for 27 Jul 50," 25 September 2000.

<sup>108</sup> 80 FBS mission data for 26 Jul 50 partially reconstructed from working papers found in Archives II, RG 342, 5AF OA Files, box RD 3564; 36 FBS Mission Summary Reports are located



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on AFHRA microfilm roll K0488. The 80th FBS did not fly on 27 July 1950; "List of F-80 Sorties for 27 Jul 50," 25 September 2000.

<sup>109</sup> "Fighter-Bomber Final Mission Summary (FEAF Intel Form #5) for 27 Jul 50 missions 35-1, 35-2, 35-3, 36-1, 39-1, and 39-2.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid; 7th Cavalry War Diary.

<sup>111</sup> Memorandum to General Timberlake, "Policy on Strafing Civilian Refugees," Colonel T.C. Rogers, DCS/Operations, HQ 5AF Advance, 25 Jul 50. Hereafter cited as "s Memorandum."

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Valley Forge (CV 45), *Report of Operations*, 16 July to 31 July 1950, 16. (Hereafter *Report of Operations*) <<http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/v-forge.htm>>

<sup>114</sup> T.C. Rogers biography in "Generals of the Army and the Air Force," vol. 2, no. 10, Dunleavy Publishing Co., Washington DC. November 1954, p. 16.

<sup>115</sup> SAF/IGI Report; Interview Officer.

<sup>116</sup> Appendix 5; E-mail, SAF/IGI to SAF/IGI, "No Gun Ri Report," 26 Jul 00, with attachment, Document 33. Hereafter to be cited as "SAF/IGI Report."

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<sup>123</sup> Grossnick, Roy A., et al, *United States Naval Aviation, 1910-1995* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), 699-704.

<sup>124</sup> Korean War, U. S. Pacific Fleet Operations, Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet, *Interim Evaluation Report No.1, 25 June to 15 November 1950*, Volume III, 228. Hereafter *Interim Evaluation Report*.

<sup>125</sup> Rogers Memorandum.

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<sup>127</sup> Rogers Memorandum.

<sup>128</sup> *Report of Operations*, 16.

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<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> *Interim Evaluation Report*, 235.

<sup>133</sup> *Report of Operations*, 2.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> VA-55, *Historical Report*, 1 July 1950 to 31 December 1950, 8.  
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<sup>136</sup> *Report of Operations*, 20.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.